From Publishers Weekly
As a staffer on the U.S. Mission to the U.N. in 1994, Barnett observed the U.N.'s reaction to the Rwandan genocide, in which an estimated 800,000 Tutsis were murdered by Hutus over a period of about three months; at the height of the killing, 5.5 deaths occurred every minute. Though officials at the U.N. Secretariat knew the facts, the U.N. took no meaningful action other than to declare that they remained "actively seized of the matter." (Barnett was himself initially opposed to intervention.) In puzzling through the U.N.'s decisions, the author offers not a scathing indictment of its timidity in the face of mass brutality so much as a searching and nuanced moral analysis. In his attempts to explain how "those working at the U.N. approached Rwanda not as individuals but rather as members of bureaucracies," Barnett carefully examines the U.N.'s institutional values and the ways in which decent international civil servants adhered to norms that repeatedly drew their attention away from the Rwandan crisis. All too aware of their powerlessness when member states refused to commit forces and desperate to avoid repetition of the debacle in Somalia (think Black Hawk Down), U.N. diplomats ultimately concluded that nonintervention was the ethical course. Barnett by no means exonerates the U.N.; in fact he insists that member states notably France and the U.S. knew of the genocide, had the power to act, yet failed to do so until it was too late. This insightful, balanced book reveals an unsettling paradox: in making choices it deemed moral, the U.N. tolerated the ultimate immorality of genocide. Copyright 2002 Cahners Business Information, Inc.


From Library Journal
Students of government are familiar with Graham Allison's Essence of Decision, which used the Cuban Missile Crisis to show how bureaucratic politics influence policy making. Barnett, who served in the U.S. Mission to the United Nations, has produced a worthy companion to Allison's work. A witness to UN inaction during the Rwanda genocide of the 1990s, he suggests that institutions can disfigure not only rational decision making, pace Allison, but also the character of the officials who work in them with disastrous results. The bureaucratic culture within the UN, maintains Barnett, produced a common understanding of the organization's role in world politics. This vision was embodied in abstract concepts such as neutrality, impartiality, and consent, as well as rules governing when peacekeeping was the right tool to defuse ethnic conflict. Applied to the Rwanda genocide, these benchmarks dictated inaction. As a result, many UN officials sincerely believed that standing idly by was not only correct but also the morally virtuous stance. A chilling work despite its pervasive academic jargon; recommended for all international affairs collections. James R. Holmes, Ph.D. candidate, Fletcher Sch. of Law & Diplomacy, Tufts Univ., Medford, MACopyright 2002 Cahners Business Information, Inc.


From Booklist
Barnett's analysis of the Rwandan crisis provides insight into the operations of the United Nations and its bureaucracy. By focusing on the internal discourse out of which the UN's far-reaching decisions would be made by both action and inaction, Barnett explores a cultural landscape few outsiders have viewed. The imperative to stop the genocide in retrospect appears a compelling indictment of the UN's failure to act. Barnett's involvement at the UN at the Somalia desk provides an initial critical view of the UN. However, he looks at alternative models for determining the direction and priorities of the UN. During this period, the UN suffered substantial defeat from the warlords in Somalia, leaving many to wonder, why bother. The UN's decisions were influenced by its responsibility to protect its troops, geopolitical constraints, and operational ethics. Yet, despite the insights, which explain alternative logics, this important, crucial analytical work tends to expose how the UN's decision-making bureaucracy, run by good people, can contribute to the evil and darkness of Rwanda. Vernon Ford
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SYNOPSIS

Why was the UN a bystander during the Rwandan genocide? Do its sins of omission leave it morally responsible for the hundreds of thousands of dead? Michael Barnett, who worked at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations from 1993 to 1994, covered Rwanda for much of the genocide. Based on his first-hand experiences, archival work, and interviews with many key participants, he reconstructs the history of the UN's involvement in Rwanda.

In the weeks leading up to the genocide, the author documents, the UN was increasingly aware or had good reason to suspect that Rwanda was a site of crimes against humanity. Yet it failed to act. Barnett argues that its indifference was driven not by incompetence or cynicism but rather by reasoned choices cradled by moral considerations. Employing a novel approach to ethics in practice and in relationship to international organizations, Barnett offers an unsettling possibility: the UN culture recast the ethical commitments of well-intentioned individuals, arresting any duty to aid at the outset of the genocide.