Book Description
This is a comprehensive and careful analysis of relations between the United States of America and the West African country of Liberia. The book describes a series of policies with new evidence presented to demonstrate that the U.S.:

* by backing one of the most vicious military dictators during the Cold War, ended 133 years of peace in Liberia and unintentionally abetted a total breakdown of its institutions that lasts to this day;

* by excessive intervention in manipulating events in 1990, prolonged an unnecessary civil war for six additional years; by attempting to micromanage the Liberian government immediately following a free and fair democratic election in 1997, withheld desperately needed aid for national reconstruction, isolated Liberia from the international community of nations, and prevented the rebuilding of the country after its devastating civil war;

*by signaling its unwillingness to help Liberia, emboldened a rebel band to move to depose the elected democratic government by force of arms (a battle that is ongoing) and, in the process, kill, torture, and displace thousands of innocent civilians;

* by persuading the United Nations to impose sanctions on Liberia to contain its president, Charles Taylor, undermined the national economy, discouraged foreign investment, and created a horrific humanitarian crisis for the civilian population of the country.

This book stresses the importance of the U.S. looking ahead and anticipating the long-term effects of its policy upon events in the country it purports to help, the international community acting quickly and constructively the moment a conflict has ended, and the danger of focusing solely on the leadership of a given country without considering the plight of its citizens. In a larger sense, it is a case study for how the United States of America treats post-conflict nations.

Demonstrating how the best of intentions can go awry, Lester S. Hyman argues for a reassessment of foreign policy toward Liberia and other post-conflict countries. He proposes a specific program of steps the United States can take to help Liberia now – suggestions that apply, as well, to other developing nations emerging from civil wars.


About the Author
Lester S. Hyman is a prominent Washington, D.C. attorney with forty-eight years of experience in law, government, and politics. A graduate of Brown University and Columbia University School of Law, he specializes in creating and implementing legislative strategies and resolving international disputes for clients, including Fortune 500 corporations, as well as countries and major companies abroad.

In 1990 Mr. Hyman was a member of the International Observer Team headed by former President Jimmy Carter, which monitored the first democratic election in the history of Haiti. He was deeply involved in peace resolution efforts during Liberia’s civil war and took part in the work of the International Negotiating Network (INN) at the Carter Center with specific reference to Liberia and Korea. He also dealt with legal and governmental issues in Japan, France, Germany, England, Lebanon, Russia, and the Caribbean. In 1996, President Clinton appointed Mr. Hyman to the 8-person Presidential Delegation that represented the United States at the historic Peace Accord signing in Guatemala, ending a 36-year civil war. From 1997 to 1999, Mr. Hyman acted as United States legal counsel for the Republic of Liberia. Because of his considerable expertise, Lester Hyman has taught "Decision-Making in Politics" at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. He is a member of the Board of Directors of the Center for National Policy, one of the country's leading public policy "think tanks."

Active in state and national politics, Mr. Hyman has served in Massachusetts as Chief Assistant to the Governor, Secretary of Commerce and Chairman of the Democratic Party. His political work at the national-level has been as an advisor to eight U.S. presidential candidates.

FROM THE PUBLISHER

This is a comprehensive and careful analysis of relations between the United States of America and the West African country of Liberia. The book describes a series of policies with new evidence presented to demonstrate that the U.S.:

* by backing one of the most vicious military dictators during the Cold War, ended 133 years of peace in Liberia and unintentionally abetted a total breakdown of its institutions that lasts to this day;

* by excessive intervention in manipulating events in 1990, prolonged an unnecessary civil war for six additional years; by attempting to micromanage the Liberian government immediately following a free and fair democratic election in 1997, withheld desperately needed aid for national reconstruction, isolated Liberia from the international community of nations, and prevented the rebuilding of the country after its devastating civil war;

*by signaling its unwillingness to help Liberia, emboldened a rebel band to move to depose the elected democratic government by force of arms (a battle that is ongoing) and, in the process, kill, torture, and displace thousands of innocent civilians;

* by persuading the United Nations to impose sanctions on Liberia to contain its president, Charles Taylor, undermined the national economy, discouraged foreign investment, and created a horrific humanitarian crisis for the civilian population of the country.

This book stresses the importance of the U.S. looking ahead and anticipating the long-term effects of its policy upon events in the country it purports to help, the international community acting quickly and constructively the moment a conflict has ended, and the danger of focusing solely on the leadership of a given country without considering the plight of its citizens. In a larger sense, it is a case study for how the United States of America treats post-conflict nations.